Earlier this month, the Supreme Court gave a disturbing judgment in Devender Pal Singh Bhullar v. NCT, Delhi, stating in essence that "terror" convicts on death row have fewer or lesser due process rights than other death row convicts, at least when it comes to deciding clemency petitions. Last week I wrote this piece titled "Bhullar, the Bogey of Human Rights, and the Death of Due Process," in which I critiqued the Court's decision. Anup Surendranath's analysis of the case is available here. Vrinda Bhandari's critique is available here.
Showing posts with label Death Penalty. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Death Penalty. Show all posts
Tuesday, April 30, 2013
Wednesday, September 28, 2011
Supreme Court substitutes death sentence by L.I.
When Supreme Court substitutes death sentence imposed by the trial court and confirmed by the High Court by a sentence of imprisonment for life, it deserves appreciation. Each such decision by the Supreme Court helps to correct the distortions which marked the jurisprudence over the years. In today's judgment in Rajesh Kumar v The State through the Government of NCT of Delhi, Justices A.K.Ganguly and D.K.Jain explain how the HC erred in awarding death sentence to the convict.
Thursday, September 15, 2011
Supreme Court's latest judgment on death penalty: A critique
Supreme Court’s recent judgment in Ajitsingh Harnamsingh Gujral v. State of Maharashtra, (hereafter referred to as Ajitsingh) deserves a close study by all those concerned about the award of death penalty in India. There can be no doubt that one would be horrified by the brutality of the murders found to have been committed by the appellant in this case. It is difficult to disagree with the Bench that circumstantial evidence is overwhelmingly against the appellant.
There are certain flaws in the judgment which are also the flaws of many judgments which the Bench has cited. There are exactly 32 precedents which the Bench cited and all of them are in defence of the Bench’s argument that the most heinous and barbaric murders are also invariably the rarest of rare cases which call for imposition of death penalty.
Rightly and most expectedly, the Bench began with the Supreme Court's judgment in the Bachan Singh case and cited the crucial sentence in Paragraph 58:
"For persons convicted of murder, life imprisonment is the rule and death sentence an exception. A real and abiding concern for the dignity of human life postulates resistance to taking a life through law's instrumentality. That ought not be done save in the rarest of rare cases when the alternative option is unquestionably foreclosed."
It is curious that the Bench has emphasised the first part of the last sentence, whereas the second part of that sentence qualifies the first part. Because of this flawed emphasis, the jurisprudence on death penalty suffered for lack of clarity and consistency since 1980, and it continues to suffer so to date. Supreme Court pointed this out in Santosh Kumar Satishbhushan Bariyar v State of Maharashtra (2009). Unfortunately, Bariyar does not find a mention in Ajitsingh.
Other cases which have been conveniently left out in this selective survey are Mulla v State of U.P. and Swami Shraddhananda which apply the law and precedents correctly.
In Bariyar, the Court noted that the mitigating circumstances listed in and endorsed by Bachan Singh give reform and rehabilitation great importance, even requiring the State to prove that this would not be possible, as a precondition before the Court awarded a death sentence.
In Paragraph 96 of Ajitsingh, the Court did not even refer to this State's responsibility to prove that the appellant could not be reformed or rehabilitated. Instead, the Bench has substituted this requirement with the opinion that a person like the appellant who, instead of doing his duty of protecting his family kills them in such a cruel and barbaric manner, could not be reformed or rehabilitated. Can a Judge's personal opinion replace the need for evidence when the alternative option is unquestionably foreclosed?
In Ajitsingh, the Court has relied on Machhi Singh (1983) and Mohd. Mannan v. State of Bihar (2011) to hold that murders which are gruesome, ghastly or horrendous, and when collective conscience of the community is petrified, death penalty is called for, as they belong to the category of rarest of rare cases. The questions whether the sentence of life imprisonment is inadequate and whether there is no alternative punishment cannot be answered with subjective views. The facts and circumstances of each murder are different, and therefore, by simply repeating the adjectives used to describe the manner of killing in earlier cases, the case before the Court does not ipso facto become rarest of rare. The distinction between ordinary murders and murders which are gruesome etc. which the Court have drawn in Paragraph 98 of Ajitsingh is not at all convincing. Neither Bachan Singh nor Machhi Singh Benches intended to draw such distinction.
The paragraphs which the Bench has cited from Mohd.Mannan in Paragraph 99 clearly suggest that it ought to have further enquired and believed that the accused condemned could not be reformed or rehabilitated and would continue with the criminal acts. There is nothing to suggest in the judgment that the Bench did this exercise. It needs to be asked whether the question was put to the prosecution during the hearing, and what was the response.
In Paragraph 99, the Bench has admitted that the expression 'rarest of the rare cases' cannot, of course, be defined with complete exactitude. I disagree, with due respect. It ought to be defined exactly; otherwise, we will be unjustly taking away the life of a convict. The broad guidelines, explained by various decisions of the Court, are not exhaustive, and sometimes confusing, with conflicting judgments.
As a matter of routine exercise, the Bench has cited the Law Commission's 35th Report in Paragraph 55. What does it say? It has concluded that deterrence object of capital punishment is achieved in a fair measure in India, on the basis of its opinion survey conducted several years ago. Instead of opinions, what we require is hard data. I wish the court has gone into such hard data, to find out, whether the capital punishment has achieved the deterrence objective over the years. The Law Commission, in that report, actually said we needed studies extending over a long period of years to know the conduct of prisoners released from jail. It was also doubtful whether any other punishment could possess all the advantages of capital punishment, and whether statistics of other countries, as to the deterrence aspect, were conclusive. A report which has expressed doubts about its own findings cannot be the basis for capital punishment.
Supreme Court has the power to commission data and studies as well, where no hard data is available. It is inexplicable why successive Benches of the Supreme Court confirming death penalty have not thought it necessary to do so.
Lastly, the Bench claims in Paragraph 101 that it is only the legislature which can abolish the death penalty and not the courts. I wonder how the Supreme Court declared Section 303 IPC unconstitutional in Mithu v State of Punjab. The Court certainly has the power to abolish, but it has chosen not to do so for other reasons.
(I thank Bikram Jeet Batra for making helpful suggestions on an earlier draft of this post. I also thank Vikram, Arun, Tarunabh and Nick for their encouraging response to the previous draft which I had circulated)
There are certain flaws in the judgment which are also the flaws of many judgments which the Bench has cited. There are exactly 32 precedents which the Bench cited and all of them are in defence of the Bench’s argument that the most heinous and barbaric murders are also invariably the rarest of rare cases which call for imposition of death penalty.
Rightly and most expectedly, the Bench began with the Supreme Court's judgment in the Bachan Singh case and cited the crucial sentence in Paragraph 58:
"For persons convicted of murder, life imprisonment is the rule and death sentence an exception. A real and abiding concern for the dignity of human life postulates resistance to taking a life through law's instrumentality. That ought not be done save in the rarest of rare cases when the alternative option is unquestionably foreclosed."
It is curious that the Bench has emphasised the first part of the last sentence, whereas the second part of that sentence qualifies the first part. Because of this flawed emphasis, the jurisprudence on death penalty suffered for lack of clarity and consistency since 1980, and it continues to suffer so to date. Supreme Court pointed this out in Santosh Kumar Satishbhushan Bariyar v State of Maharashtra (2009). Unfortunately, Bariyar does not find a mention in Ajitsingh.
Other cases which have been conveniently left out in this selective survey are Mulla v State of U.P. and Swami Shraddhananda which apply the law and precedents correctly.
In Bariyar, the Court noted that the mitigating circumstances listed in and endorsed by Bachan Singh give reform and rehabilitation great importance, even requiring the State to prove that this would not be possible, as a precondition before the Court awarded a death sentence.
In Paragraph 96 of Ajitsingh, the Court did not even refer to this State's responsibility to prove that the appellant could not be reformed or rehabilitated. Instead, the Bench has substituted this requirement with the opinion that a person like the appellant who, instead of doing his duty of protecting his family kills them in such a cruel and barbaric manner, could not be reformed or rehabilitated. Can a Judge's personal opinion replace the need for evidence when the alternative option is unquestionably foreclosed?
In Ajitsingh, the Court has relied on Machhi Singh (1983) and Mohd. Mannan v. State of Bihar (2011) to hold that murders which are gruesome, ghastly or horrendous, and when collective conscience of the community is petrified, death penalty is called for, as they belong to the category of rarest of rare cases. The questions whether the sentence of life imprisonment is inadequate and whether there is no alternative punishment cannot be answered with subjective views. The facts and circumstances of each murder are different, and therefore, by simply repeating the adjectives used to describe the manner of killing in earlier cases, the case before the Court does not ipso facto become rarest of rare. The distinction between ordinary murders and murders which are gruesome etc. which the Court have drawn in Paragraph 98 of Ajitsingh is not at all convincing. Neither Bachan Singh nor Machhi Singh Benches intended to draw such distinction.
The paragraphs which the Bench has cited from Mohd.Mannan in Paragraph 99 clearly suggest that it ought to have further enquired and believed that the accused condemned could not be reformed or rehabilitated and would continue with the criminal acts. There is nothing to suggest in the judgment that the Bench did this exercise. It needs to be asked whether the question was put to the prosecution during the hearing, and what was the response.
In Paragraph 99, the Bench has admitted that the expression 'rarest of the rare cases' cannot, of course, be defined with complete exactitude. I disagree, with due respect. It ought to be defined exactly; otherwise, we will be unjustly taking away the life of a convict. The broad guidelines, explained by various decisions of the Court, are not exhaustive, and sometimes confusing, with conflicting judgments.
As a matter of routine exercise, the Bench has cited the Law Commission's 35th Report in Paragraph 55. What does it say? It has concluded that deterrence object of capital punishment is achieved in a fair measure in India, on the basis of its opinion survey conducted several years ago. Instead of opinions, what we require is hard data. I wish the court has gone into such hard data, to find out, whether the capital punishment has achieved the deterrence objective over the years. The Law Commission, in that report, actually said we needed studies extending over a long period of years to know the conduct of prisoners released from jail. It was also doubtful whether any other punishment could possess all the advantages of capital punishment, and whether statistics of other countries, as to the deterrence aspect, were conclusive. A report which has expressed doubts about its own findings cannot be the basis for capital punishment.
Supreme Court has the power to commission data and studies as well, where no hard data is available. It is inexplicable why successive Benches of the Supreme Court confirming death penalty have not thought it necessary to do so.
Lastly, the Bench claims in Paragraph 101 that it is only the legislature which can abolish the death penalty and not the courts. I wonder how the Supreme Court declared Section 303 IPC unconstitutional in Mithu v State of Punjab. The Court certainly has the power to abolish, but it has chosen not to do so for other reasons.
(I thank Bikram Jeet Batra for making helpful suggestions on an earlier draft of this post. I also thank Vikram, Arun, Tarunabh and Nick for their encouraging response to the previous draft which I had circulated)
Saturday, February 12, 2011
A new era begins in Egypt

As Egypt begins its post-Mubarak era, the successful revolution is sure to leave many bewildered. Till recently, political scientists hardly considered Egypt a possible candidate for a successful revolution, with many characteristics of historical revolutions being absent there. Even as Indian observers debate the question of why and how Egyptian revolution cannot be replicated in India, the unique characteristics of Egyptian revolution will be of interest to the readers here. Frontline's latest issue, published before the revolution became successful, explores the protest movement in Cairo and what it signified.
My contributions to this issue include an article on the Supreme Court's recent judgment and its partial modification in the Graham Staines murder case in the wake of civil society's outrage against some remarks of the Judges. I argue that the modification of the judgment, still leaves one dissatisfied.
The second one is a review article, dealing with Durga Das Basu's Commentary, and Shorter Constitution's latest editions. The article also discusses two more books of interest, trying to find the answer to the question why and how the Indian Constitution is resilient.
Wednesday, May 26, 2010
Kasab's Sentence II
Whether the sentencing of Kasab to death followed the procedural and substantive guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court in Santosh Bariyar will probably form an important argument in his appeal. In the meantime, readers may form their own opinions by reading the 1588-page judgment of the trial court. Also, readers may be interested in Manoj Mitta's excellent article on death penalty law in India.
Thursday, May 20, 2010
From the latest Frontline....
*Justice or revenge? Bikramjeet Batra's article on Kasab's sentence and the implications.
*Moment of Truth: My article on the Supreme Court's judgment banning forced Narco tests. Rajeev Dhavan in his Mail Today article offers a different perspective on this, saying the Supreme Court ought not to have allowed testing, even if the accused/suspect voluntarily agrees to it. He is correct - the lines between voluntariness and compulsion are often blurred.
*The Khushboo case: My article on why the defendants in the Khushboo case did not really lose, having succeeded in dragging her to the Court, and silencing her from speaking on the taboo subject again.
*My review article on whether there is an underlying pattern to the rise, sustenance and demise of sub-national movements.
*Moment of Truth: My article on the Supreme Court's judgment banning forced Narco tests. Rajeev Dhavan in his Mail Today article offers a different perspective on this, saying the Supreme Court ought not to have allowed testing, even if the accused/suspect voluntarily agrees to it. He is correct - the lines between voluntariness and compulsion are often blurred.
*The Khushboo case: My article on why the defendants in the Khushboo case did not really lose, having succeeded in dragging her to the Court, and silencing her from speaking on the taboo subject again.
*My review article on whether there is an underlying pattern to the rise, sustenance and demise of sub-national movements.
Thursday, May 6, 2010
On Kasab's sentence
One of our regular readers, Vinod George Joseph, has written a persuasive piece on his blog on why Kasab should be kept alive. I agree with him fully.
I have not read the trial court's judgment yet. But from the newspaper reports, the reasons for the award of death sentence to Kasab are hardly convincing. To cite a few:
1. Keeping him alive will invite Kandahar-type incidents: Apart from the fact that it is speculative and hypothetical, and death penalty cannot be awarded for such reasons, it also exposes our own vulnerabilities and lack of confidence that we could ensure fool-proof security to those who travel by air.
2. Kasab can't be reformed: Absolutely true. That is why Supreme Court has repeatedly said for such offenders life sentence must mean life sentence, and he need not be released till he dies of natural causes. The question of reform of a convict is relevant only if he is likely to be released at some point of time in future.
3. Kasab did not show any remorse:: The question of remorse is a subjective feeling, and can be considered only when he seeks pardon or commutation of his sentence. If he suffers a life sentence, the question of considering his remorse or lack of remorse does not arise.
4. It will be a deterrent: This cliche has no meaning as far as Kasab is concerned. Criminals like Kasab are not afraid of death, and therefore, is unlikely to deter future Kasabs. On the contrary, killing him will invite future Kasabs seek retribution, which will mean putting ourselves to risk all over again.
The public celebration of the sentence in Mumbai, and the public display of glee by the Public Prosecutor over the sentence reveal what would have been the response had the Judge given Kasab life sentence rather than Death penalty.
I have not read the trial court's judgment yet. But from the newspaper reports, the reasons for the award of death sentence to Kasab are hardly convincing. To cite a few:
1. Keeping him alive will invite Kandahar-type incidents: Apart from the fact that it is speculative and hypothetical, and death penalty cannot be awarded for such reasons, it also exposes our own vulnerabilities and lack of confidence that we could ensure fool-proof security to those who travel by air.
2. Kasab can't be reformed: Absolutely true. That is why Supreme Court has repeatedly said for such offenders life sentence must mean life sentence, and he need not be released till he dies of natural causes. The question of reform of a convict is relevant only if he is likely to be released at some point of time in future.
3. Kasab did not show any remorse:: The question of remorse is a subjective feeling, and can be considered only when he seeks pardon or commutation of his sentence. If he suffers a life sentence, the question of considering his remorse or lack of remorse does not arise.
4. It will be a deterrent: This cliche has no meaning as far as Kasab is concerned. Criminals like Kasab are not afraid of death, and therefore, is unlikely to deter future Kasabs. On the contrary, killing him will invite future Kasabs seek retribution, which will mean putting ourselves to risk all over again.
The public celebration of the sentence in Mumbai, and the public display of glee by the Public Prosecutor over the sentence reveal what would have been the response had the Judge given Kasab life sentence rather than Death penalty.
Wednesday, March 31, 2010
Life imprisonment & premature release: Nalini's case is a timely reminder
By Bikram Jeet Batra
The Tamil Nadu Government has rejected an application by Nalini – one of the convicts in the Rajiv Gandhi assassination case – seeking a premature release from her sentence of imprisonment for life (LI). Readers will recall that although Nalini was sentenced to death, the Governor of Tamil Nadu commuted her sentence to LI. Nalini has now completed nearly 19 years imprisonment. In all sentences commuted to LI, the convict must serve a minimum of 14 years imprisonment. Thereafter they have a right to be considered for premature release although not a right to be released.
Although the report of the prison advisory board is yet not available and the reasons for the refusal are unclear, Nalini’s case is a rare one where there was extensive media coverage regarding the premature release deliberations and decision-making. This case also highlights the fact that the executive does not automatically commute life sentences after 14-years imprisonment. Under the present system, where the State believes it has sufficient reason to keep a person in jail beyond 14 years, it can do so – with reasons supplied and subject to judicial review.
Why then are our judges so keen to reject the existing system of remission and premature release? In a series of judgments, the Supreme Court has created a new category of LI – where judges will lay down a much higher minimum term at the time of sentencing. In addition to ‘ordinary’ murders where regular LI would be sufficient and ‘rarest of the rare’ where a death sentence is to be awarded; there is now a third category of ‘rare’ murders where the Judge can award any minimum term between 14 years and whole-life.
I have written on this blog previously about the constitutional and penological questions that arise from these sentences. There are some obvious sentencing concerns as well. The creation of this new category of lifers with variable minimum-terms has come without any deliberation on a framework or process to assist judges in determining the length of sentence. In the past few years, many Supreme Court judgments have accepted that the functioning of the ‘rarest of the rare’ formulation in capital sentencing was arbitrary and unsatisfactory. How will this new categorization avoid the same?
Glaring discrepancies are already visible in the new LI judgments. Last year, in State v. Shree Gopal @ Mani Gopal (where the new category was named ‘rare’), the Delhi High Court awarded a minimum of 20 years. In March 2010 the same judgment was cited as a precedent by a trial judge in Delhi who however decided that a 30-year term would be appropriate (State v. Jitender @ Kallu). Such discrepancies are not entirely surprising since the Supreme Court itself has ranged from 20-35 years and even to whole life sentences.
This is no minor issue. Lifers form over half of our entire convict population and over 8500 persons were sentenced to LI in murder cases in 2008 alone. With trial judges across the country now free to determine the minimum term – without any guidance whatsoever – wherever they deem the case to be a ‘rare’ murder, there is bound to be chaos in terms of sentencing.
The Supreme Court believes that creation of this new category is necessary since the executive acts mechanically in releasing lifers after the minimum 14 years imprisonment. Nalini’s case is a reminder that this entire change is unnecessary. Our existing system of LI can address any problem of mechanical release by ensuring there is some pressure on the executive to follow due process and apply its mind. In this case it was political actors and the media that brought the pressure. Monitoring by the Supreme Court or even the NHRC can have the same result for the thousands of other, lesser visible cases. Instead of resorting to a few tweaks that can achieve the desired result, our judges, inspired by similar ‘tariff’ systems of life imprisonment abroad, are treading down the dangerous path of piecemeal change.
[Bikram Jeet Batra is India campaigner at Amnesty International. The views expressed here are his own.]
The Tamil Nadu Government has rejected an application by Nalini – one of the convicts in the Rajiv Gandhi assassination case – seeking a premature release from her sentence of imprisonment for life (LI). Readers will recall that although Nalini was sentenced to death, the Governor of Tamil Nadu commuted her sentence to LI. Nalini has now completed nearly 19 years imprisonment. In all sentences commuted to LI, the convict must serve a minimum of 14 years imprisonment. Thereafter they have a right to be considered for premature release although not a right to be released.
Although the report of the prison advisory board is yet not available and the reasons for the refusal are unclear, Nalini’s case is a rare one where there was extensive media coverage regarding the premature release deliberations and decision-making. This case also highlights the fact that the executive does not automatically commute life sentences after 14-years imprisonment. Under the present system, where the State believes it has sufficient reason to keep a person in jail beyond 14 years, it can do so – with reasons supplied and subject to judicial review.
Why then are our judges so keen to reject the existing system of remission and premature release? In a series of judgments, the Supreme Court has created a new category of LI – where judges will lay down a much higher minimum term at the time of sentencing. In addition to ‘ordinary’ murders where regular LI would be sufficient and ‘rarest of the rare’ where a death sentence is to be awarded; there is now a third category of ‘rare’ murders where the Judge can award any minimum term between 14 years and whole-life.
I have written on this blog previously about the constitutional and penological questions that arise from these sentences. There are some obvious sentencing concerns as well. The creation of this new category of lifers with variable minimum-terms has come without any deliberation on a framework or process to assist judges in determining the length of sentence. In the past few years, many Supreme Court judgments have accepted that the functioning of the ‘rarest of the rare’ formulation in capital sentencing was arbitrary and unsatisfactory. How will this new categorization avoid the same?
Glaring discrepancies are already visible in the new LI judgments. Last year, in State v. Shree Gopal @ Mani Gopal (where the new category was named ‘rare’), the Delhi High Court awarded a minimum of 20 years. In March 2010 the same judgment was cited as a precedent by a trial judge in Delhi who however decided that a 30-year term would be appropriate (State v. Jitender @ Kallu). Such discrepancies are not entirely surprising since the Supreme Court itself has ranged from 20-35 years and even to whole life sentences.
This is no minor issue. Lifers form over half of our entire convict population and over 8500 persons were sentenced to LI in murder cases in 2008 alone. With trial judges across the country now free to determine the minimum term – without any guidance whatsoever – wherever they deem the case to be a ‘rare’ murder, there is bound to be chaos in terms of sentencing.
The Supreme Court believes that creation of this new category is necessary since the executive acts mechanically in releasing lifers after the minimum 14 years imprisonment. Nalini’s case is a reminder that this entire change is unnecessary. Our existing system of LI can address any problem of mechanical release by ensuring there is some pressure on the executive to follow due process and apply its mind. In this case it was political actors and the media that brought the pressure. Monitoring by the Supreme Court or even the NHRC can have the same result for the thousands of other, lesser visible cases. Instead of resorting to a few tweaks that can achieve the desired result, our judges, inspired by similar ‘tariff’ systems of life imprisonment abroad, are treading down the dangerous path of piecemeal change.
[Bikram Jeet Batra is India campaigner at Amnesty International. The views expressed here are his own.]
Sunday, March 14, 2010
Curative Petitions: The first-ever success
The Supreme Court has given relief to a curative petitioner for the first time since it was introduced, in this case on March 9. Imagine if Justice Pasayat had given death penalty in this case, when it was first decided by the Supreme Court, and the sentence duly executed, what would have been the decision of the Supreme Court on the curative petition? Is it not the right time for the Supreme Court to review the constitutionality of death penalty afresh in the light of the success of this curative petition?
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